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I. Introduction
Sexual orientation and gender identity are legally-protected
categories in international human rights law and many States.1 For
the past two decades, States and regional (and the universal) human
rights systems have expanded the understanding of antidiscrimination law in ways that to many seemed unexpected. Until
2000, no country had legalized same-sex marriage.2 Less than

† Assistant Professor, Rutgers Law School.
1 See Dominic McGoldrick, The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination under International Human Rights Law, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 613 (2016);
Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination, in 2.2
COMPARATIVE DISCRIMINATION LAW 14 (2018).
2 The Netherlands became the first country in the world to legalize same-sex
marriage in 2000, with the law taking effect in April 2001. See Same-Sex Dutch Couples
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twenty years later, more than two dozen countries recognize samesex marriage, and many more recognize same-sex civil unions.3
Along with the recognition of sexual orientation as a prohibited
ground of discrimination, gender identity has also become a legally
significant concept for human rights law.4
In Latin America, a region traditionally labeled as socially
conservative,5 sexuality laws have also undergone unprecedented
changes. In 2008, Uruguay became the first Latin American
country to legalize civil unions,6 and then promptly turned to discuss
a same-sex adoption law.7 In March 2010, the Legislative Assembly
of the Federal District of Mexico made the city the first in Latin
America to legalize same-sex marriage.8 A few months later,
Argentina’s National Congress passed a historic reform that made
it the first Latin American country to legalize same-sex marriage,9
the field having been opened a few years earlier by the Colombian
Constitutional Court’s recognition of rights of heterosexual and

Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/20/world/same-sex-dutch-couples-gain-marriage-andadoption-rights.html [https://perma.cc/3KSF-KDQJ].
3 See Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, Same-Sex Marriage: Global
Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (CFR) (last updated Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/same-sex-marriage-global-comparisons
[https://perma.cc/P4WX-7MKV].
4 See Holning Lau, Gender Recognition as a Human Right, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK ON NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC (Andreas von
Arnauld, Kerstin von der Decken & Mart Susi eds., forthcoming).
5 See Omar G. Encarnación, Latin America’s Rights Riddle: Why the Region Says
Yes to Same-Sex Marriage and No to Abortion, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/27/latin-americas-rights-riddle/
[https://perma.cc/54QR-EEH6].
6 Ley No. 18.246, Unión Concubinaria Regulación [The Concubinary Union Law,
Law on Concubinage], 10 Jan. 2008 (Uru.).
7 See Dario Klein, Uruguay Nears Same-Sex Adoption Law, CNN (Aug. 29, 2009),
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/08/27/uruguay.gays/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PM3J-G2V3].
8 See Elisabeth Malkin, Gay Marriage Puts Mexico City at Center of Debate, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
6,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/world/americas/07mexico.html
[https://perma.cc/C6TY-WVR4].
9 See Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentina Approves Gay Marriage, in a First for Region,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
15,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/world/americas/16argentina.html
[https://perma.cc/7DD4-MCMM].
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homosexual couples based on the principle of constitutional
equality.10
Such legal developments cannot be understood without an
examination of the role of Latin America’s human rights court—the
San Jose-based Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This
Article discusses the development of sexual orientation and gender
identity in the context of inter-American human rights law, in
particular, by looking at the decisions of the Inter-American Court.11
The Article focuses on three contentious decisions and one advisory
opinion, discussing the issues at hand in each case and the ways in
which the Court has addressed the implications for sexual
orientation and gender identity, as well as the institutional concerns
that decisions by international tribunals have upon the law of
domestic States. Three cases will be studied to understand these
implications: Atala and Daughters v. Chile; Duque v. Colombia;
and Flor Freire v. Ecuador; and Advisory Opinion OC 24-17,
concerning same-sex marriage and right to name change. The
impact of these decisions demonstrates the quick nature in which
the idea of sexual orientation and gender identity as a protected
category has changed and developed in a short period of time.
II. Caselaw on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
This Section discusses the three contentious decisions that the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has handed down on sexual
orientation and gender identity, as well as the advisory opinion on
gender identity and same-sex marriage. The decisions are examined
in chronological order. As shown below, the first judgment—Atala
and Daughters v. Chile—paved the way for subsequent decisions
on a variety of related matters. These included the recognition of
10 See Julieta Lemaitre Ripoll, Love in the Time of Cholera: LGBT Rights in
Colombia, 11 SUR-INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 73, 75–76 (2009); see also Joshua Goodman,
Colombia to Recognize Rights of Gays, WASH. POST (June 15, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501449.html [https://perma.cc/ZC7V-E4CH].
11 The Article focuses only on the Inter-American Court’s caselaw. It should be
noted, however, that the inter-American system is also comprised of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, a quasi-judicial body that receives and handles human
rights petitions and submits cases to the Court. The Commission has been a critical actor
in the expansion of sexual orientation and gender identity as legal categories. See, e.g.,
Violence Against LGBTI Persons, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/violencelgbtipersons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3HJ-HEP3].
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economic rights for same-sex couples12 to the finding that all
members of the Organization of American States should legalize
same-sex marriage as a question of international law—a doctrine
that no other international court had thus far articulated.13
A. The Inter-American Court Breaks Latin American Ground:
Atala and Daughters v. Chile
In February 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
held for the first time in its history that sexual orientation and gender
identity are protected categories under the American Convention on
Human Rights.14 In a decision labeled as “groundbreaking”15 and
“historic,”16 the Inter-American Court construed Article 1.1 of the
American Convention as encompassing a prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (and gender
identity).17

12 See Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016).
13 State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights
Derived from a Relationship Between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of
Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, In Relation to Article 1, of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-24/17]. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights is the first international tribunal to declare that same-sex marriage
is an individual right protected by international human rights law.
14 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012). I must disclaim
that I acted as leading co-counsel in Ms. Atala’s petition before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and later, in the case before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.
15 See Rosa M. Celorio, The Case of Karen Atala and Daughters: Toward a Better
Understanding of Discrimination, Equality, and the Rights of Women, 15 CUNY L. REV.
335, 340 (2012).
16 See The ICJ Welcomes Historic Decision in Atala v. Chile, INT’L COMM. JURISTS
(Mar. 23, 2012), https://www.icj.org/the-icj-welcomes-historic-decision-in-atala-v-chile/
[https://perma.cc/46UM-84XC]; LGBT Rights Upheld in Historic Inter-American Court
Ruling,
OUTRIGHT
ACTION
INT.
(Mar.
22,
2012),
https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/lgbt-rights-upheld-historic-inter-americancourt-ruling [https://perma.cc/Z47S-JAGJ].
17 Article 1.1 of the American Convention states: “The States Parties to this
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure
to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other
social condition” (emphasis added). American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21,
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1. Facts and Local Decisions
The case arose from a 2004 decision by Chile’s Supreme Court
which stripped Ms. Atala of the custody of her three daughters at
the request of her ex-husband, who objected to the girls living with
Ms. Atala and her same-sex partner.18 In 2002, Atala, a criminal
judge, and her husband, Mr. Ricardo López Allendes, a public
defender, put an end to a nine-year marriage, and jointly decided
that Ms. Atala would maintain the care and custody of the three girls
and that Mr. López would visit them every week.19 At the end of
2002, Atala’s same-sex partner moved in with her and her three
daughters.20 In January 2003, López Allende filed a custody suit
arguing that the girls’ “physical and emotional development was
seriously at risk” by their mother’s decision to have her same-sex
partner live with them.21 The applicant also filed a suit for
provisional custody which the Juvenile Court of Villarrica granted,
“even though it expressly acknowledged that there was no evidence
to presume the legal incompetence of the mother.”22 The court

1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. The Court found that the two categories were included in the
open-ended clause “any other social condition.” Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 91.
18 The Supreme Court found that the children must be raised in “a traditional
Chilean” household, with a father and a mother. By having her partner move in with the
family, the Supreme Court declared that Ms. Atala neglected her children’s best interest,
notwithstanding that the three children had expressly said they wanted to live with their
mother (and their mother’s partner), and that no expert witness raised objections to Ms.
Atala’s parenting. See Corte Suprema [C.S.] [Supreme Court], 31 mayo 2004, “Atala
Riffo,” Rol No. 1193-03, custodia ¶ 20.
19 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, at ¶ 30.
20 See id.
21 The girls’ father argued that Ms. Atala was “not capable of watching over and
caring for [the three girls, given that] her new sexual lifestyle choice, together with her
cohabiting in a lesbian relationship with another woman, [were] producing . . . harmful
consequences for the development of these minors . . . .” He further claimed that legally
treating same-sex partners would “distort the meaning of a human couple, man and
woman, and therefore [would] alter the natural meaning of the family . . . since it affects
the fundamental values of the family, as the core unit of society.” Finally, López argued
that it was necessary “to take into account all the consequences of a biological nature that
would be implied for minors living with a lesbian couple . . . solely in terms of diseases,
given the sexual practices of a lesbian couple, the girls are under constant risk of
contracting sexually transmitted diseases such as herpes and AIDS.” Id. ¶ 31.
22 The Juvenile Court’s main argument was that respondent Atala “has given
preference to her own well-being and personal interest over carrying out her role as a
mother, under conditions that could affect the subsequent development of the minors in
the case.” Id. ¶ 41.
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advanced an argument that would eventually make its way to the
Supreme Court and ultimately resulted in the Inter-American
Court’s rebuke of the Chilean courts.23 The lower court stated that
there was “no conclusion other than the petitioner [Mr. López]
presents more favorable arguments on behalf of the best interest of
the girls, arguments which, in the context of a heterosexual and
traditional society, take on great importance.”24 Through a
provisional custody decision, based on a supposed significance of
reinforcing traditional models of the family, Karen Atala ultimately
lost custody of her three daughters permanently.25
Ms. Atala impugned the judge’s impartiality, noting that he had
already advanced an opinion against homosexuality and was
therefore unable to render a fair judgment.26 The judge was forced
to step down and the court’s secretary took up the role of acting
judge.27 In October 2003, the new judge handed down a merits
decision, rejecting the petitioner’s custody suit.28 In its merits
judgment, the court observed that:
The respondent’s sexual orientation was not an impediment to
carrying out responsible motherhood, that there was no
psychiatric pathology that would prevent her from exercising her
‘role as a mother,’ and that there were no indications that would
allow for the presumption of any grounds for incapacity on the
part of the mother to take on the personal care of the minors.29

See generally id.
Id. ¶ 41 (quoting decision in the provisional custody proceeding by the Juvenile
Court of Villarrica, May 2, 2003) (emphasis added).
25 Media outlets’ extensive coverage of the case (see Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239)
caused the Judiciary to open an investigation against Judge Atala based on accusations that
she had used the government’s property for personal business related to LGBTI rights
advocacy and that she had disclosed her sexual orientation to members of her chambers.
A special judge investigator appointed to conduct the investigation concluded that “it
[was] impossible to sidestep the fact that her peculiar emotional relationship has
transcended the private sphere with the appearance of the above-mentioned publications,
which clearly damages the image of both Ms. Atala and the Judiciary.” See id. ¶ 214
(quoting report prepared by Justice Lenin Lillo of the Court of Appeals of Temuco, April
2, 2003). See infra, note 60.
26 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 232.
27 See id. ¶ 43.
28 See id. ¶ 44.
29 See id.
23
24
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The court’s decision considered significant evidence to rule
against Mr. López Allende.30 It reviewed reports from international
organizations, academic institutions, and social workers31 that
dismissed the claims of an alleged risk for the girls to contract
sexually-transmitted diseases because of their mother’s sexual
orientation, and that proved that they lived in a “harmonious family
environment, with clear rules and limits and a family routine that
operates appropriately with the supervision of the mother.”32 On the
argument that the girls could be subject to discrimination, the court
held that any custody decision must be based on “definite and
proven facts in the case and not on mere suppositions or fears.”33
Finally, the court addressed the critical issue of the children’s right
to be heard, observing that two of them “expressed their desire to
return to live with their mother” and the third one expressed “a slight
preference for [living with] the mother.”34
After the court ordered Mr. López to hand over the girls to Ms.
Atala, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals of
Temuco along with a temporary injunction requesting the Court to
suspend the lower court’s order.35 López argued that “complying
with the decision would mean a radical and violent change in the
girls’ current status quo.”36 The Appellate Court ruled in his favor
and granted the injunction: the girls were to remain with their father
while the Court reviewed the appeal.37
The Court of Appeals’ merits decision came down in March
2004 upholding the district court’s decision that rejected Mr.
López’s custody lawsuit.38 The Court also reversed the injunction
previously granted in favor of López.39 With the two merits
decisions in favor of Atala (and her daughters), it seemed that the
case was over. Yet, Mr. López turned to the Supreme Court through
a disciplinary complaint against the Appellate Court justices,

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

See id. ¶ 35 n.44, ¶ 58 n.76.
See id. ¶ 45, 47.
See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 45.
See id. ¶ 48.
See id. ¶ 49.
Id. ¶ 50.
See id.
Id. ¶ 51.
See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 52.
See id.
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arguing that the justices had acted with “fault and serious and
flagrant abuse,” ignoring evidence showing that the “open
expression of lesbian behavior produced directly and immediately
in [the girls] confusion regarding sexual roles that interfered and
would later interfere with the development of a clear and defined
sexual identity.”40 As he had done in the Appellate Court
proceedings, López also filed an injunction before the Supreme
Court seeking to maintain the custody of the girls while the Supreme
Court reviewed the disciplinary matter.41 The Supreme Court
granted the injunction.42 Despite having two merits decisions in
their favor, provisional injunctions effectively obstructed Ms.
Atala’s and her daughters’ efforts to reunite.43
In May 2004, in a 3-2 judgment, the Supreme Court of Chile
found that the appellate judges had effectively acted with abuse by
failing to consider the evidence on “the deterioration of the social,
family and educational environment of the girls since the mother
began to cohabit with her homosexual partner, or the possibility that
the girls could be the target of social discrimination arising from this
fact.”44 The Court held that Ms. Atala put her own interests before
those of her children “when she chose to begin to live with a same
sex partner,” and that there was “potential confusion over sexual
roles that could be caused . . . by the absence from home of a male
father.”45 Finally, the plurality held that the Court of Appeals had
neglected the girls’ right “to live and grow within the bosom of a
family that is structured normally and appreciated in the social
environment, according to the proper traditional model.”46 Thus the
Supreme Court put an end to the domestic proceedings in the case.47
Atala had lost the custody of her daughters, despite the merits
See id. ¶ 53.
Id.
42 Id.
43 See id. ¶ 56 (describing how Ms. Atala alleges that the court ignored evidence in
and subsequently granted custody to López, regardless of that evidence).
44 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 56 (internal citation omitted). Some of the
evidence that the Supreme Court refers to in its decision is “the testimony of persons close
to the girls, such as the house maids [who refer to] games and attitudes of the girls that
reflect confusion about the sexuality of the mother, which they could have perceived in the
new cohabitation scheme at their home.” Id.
45 See id.
46 Id. ¶ 57.
47 See id.
40
41
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decisions that had weighed the evidence, including the girls’ own
statements.48
In November 2004, Karen Atala filed a petition before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, which initially asked the
parties—Atala and her daughters and the State of Chile—to seek a
friendly agreement.49 After two years of negotiations, the
petitioners decided to put an end to the procedure as it became clear
that the State was not willing to acknowledge its international
responsibility.50 The procedure before the Commission was crucial,
among other things, in allowing the Commission to understand the
implications of the case and the existence of a violation under the
American Convention on Human Rights—that despite the
Convention’s silence on the issue of sexual orientation, it was a
protected category under inter-American human rights law.
2. The Inter-American Court’s decision
In February 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
issued its decision, finding that Chile had violated the rights of
Karen Atala and her daughters to the equal protection of the laws,
their right to family life, to privacy, and certain rights concerning
the judicial protection of their rights.51 Atala broke ground in Latin
America as it was the first time that the regional human rights court
expressly addressed the matter of sexual orientation (and gender
identity—a matter that was not originally part of the petitioners’
submission). In order to do so, the Court based its decision in
numerous sources of both international and domestic law.
The judgment’s most salient feature is the finding that the equal
protection clause of the American Convention on Human Rights
encompasses the right not to be discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity.52 The Court started by reiterating
its doctrine that human rights treaties are “living instruments” that

48 See id (finding that even though the evidence was not properly considered, placing
the girls with their father was still appropriate).
49 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 31.
50 See Jorge Contesse, Settling Human Rights Violations, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. __
(forthcoming 2019) (discussing the friendly settlement procedure in the case of Karen
Atala’s petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
51 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012).
52 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 86.
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must be interpreted according to the changing circumstances of
social life.53 This interpretative departure point is crucial to frame
the Court’s analysis, as the Court was declaring that, despite the
American Convention’s silence on the matter, sexual orientation
and gender identity were in fact prohibited grounds for
discrimination. The Court based its holding not only on the
developments of inter-American law, the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, and U.N. treaty bodies54 but also
on legal developments taking place in Latin American countries.
The combination of international human rights standards and
domestic constitutional law allowed the Court to bolster its novel
finding and set the stage for the subsequent development of
sexuality rights in Latin American law.
First, the Court resorted to resolutions adopted by the
Organization of American States’ General Assembly on the
protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on
their sexual orientation.55 The Court’s goal was to show that on the
inter-American level, States were already moving in the direction of
granting recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity as a
matter of regional human rights law. Second, the Court moved into
universal human rights law. It cited communications by the Human
Rights Committee,56 and general comments by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,57 the Committee on the
Rights of the Child,58 the Committee against Torture,59 and the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,60
See id. ¶ 83.
See id. ¶ 87–90.
55 See id. ¶ 86. The Court pointed to “four successive resolutions referring to the
protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation,
demanding the adoption of specific measures for an effective protection against
discriminatory acts”, four acts were passed in multiple years: “Human rights, sexual
orientation and gender identity, approved at the fourth plenary session.” Id. ¶ 86 n.97.
56 See id. ¶ 88 (citing Toonen v. Australia, indicating that gender encompasses sexual
orientation).
57 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 89.
58 See id. ¶ 89.
59 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Application of Article 2 by
States Parties, CAT/C/GC/2, ¶¶ 20–21 (Jan. 24, 2008).
60 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. 27. Women of age and the protection of their human rights,
CEDAW/C/GC/27, ¶ 13 (Dec. 16, 2010); Draft of General Recommendation Nº 28 in
relation to Article 2 of the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination
53
54
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that establish that sexual orientation and gender identity are
protected grounds under international law. Finally, the Court
looked at the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights, as
that court had established, more than a decade earlier, that sexual
orientation was a protected category under Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.61 With these references,
the Inter-American Court effectively held that the recognition of
sexual orientation and gender identity was a universal (and
European) human rights concern.62
The Court also added a local basis for its top-down import of
universal and European law into inter-American human rights law.
The Court looked to Latin American legislation and case law,
showing how some countries have recognized sexual orientation
and gender identity as fundamental human rights.63 In particular,
the Court looked at case law from the Supreme Court of Mexico64
and comparative law developments both in Latin America and
elsewhere.65 The Court used these examples to bolster an argument
that the State had raised and that—as explained below—States have
brought up in other cases: the lack of consensus in Latin American

against women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, ¶ 18 (Dec. 16, 2010).
61 Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: “The enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth
or other status.” Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, as amended
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 (June 2010) (emphasis added). In Atala, the Inter-American
Court wrongly referred to the European Convention’s clause as “another condition,” not
“any ground.” Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 87. The Inter-American Court cited four
decisions by its sister court in Europe: Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (No.
33290/96), Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (Dec. 21, 1999); L. and V. v. Austria (No. 39392/98 and
39829/98), Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45 (Jan. 9, 2003); S.L. v. Austria (No. 45330/99), Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶ 37 (Jan. 9, 2003); and E.B. v. France (No. 43546/02), Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (Jan. 22, 2008).
62 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 284.
63 Id. ¶¶ 126, 137 (quoting the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico, Action of
Unconstitutionality A.I. 2/2010, August 16, 2010).
64 Id.
65 The Court noted that “[w]ithin the framework of comparative law some States
explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in their Constitutions (for
example Bolivia, Ecuador, Kosovo, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland).”
Id. ¶ 90 n.113. The Court expressly referred to recent legislative reform in Argentina, with
the adoption of same-sex marriage, and Uruguay, with the recognition of civil unions
between same-sex couples in 2009. Id.
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countries on the scope of sexual orientation as a fundamental right.66
In its response to Ms. Atala’s pleadings, the respondent State
noted that “sexual orientation was not a suspect category on which
there was consensus in 2004,”67 and that “it would not be
appropriate to demand [that the Supreme Court of Chile] pass a
strict scrutiny test for a category on which the Inter-American
consensus is recent.”68 The State further made an argument on
subsidiarity, observing that the Court may damage its “credibility
and trust” if it “assumes an excessively regulatory role, without
considering the views of the majority of the States.”69 As explored
below, the issue of “credibility and trust” has become more
pressing, especially as the Court furthers its case law on sexual
orientation and gender identity.70
The “lack of consensus” argument was a clever one, albeit
flawed. According to the State, just as the Inter-American Court
cites the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to
buttress its finding that sexual orientation is a protected category
under human rights law, so should the Court adopt the European
Court’s “European consensus” doctrine, with its corollary notion of
the margin of appreciation.71 In the present case, the Inter-American
Court dismissed the State’s argument, noting that lack of consensus
See id. ¶ 75.
67 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 75.
68 Id.
69 Id. ¶ 74. On the principle of subsidiarity in international law, see Paolo G.
Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003) and Gerald Neuman, Subsidiarity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 360 (D. Shelton ed., 2013).
70 See infra Part II.D.
71 According to this doctrine, the European Court refrains from adjudicating cases
that involve public morals whenever it finds that European countries have not reached a
consensus on the topic. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 382 (1997). One of
the most salient applications of the “European consensus” doctrine, relevant to the
discussion in this Article, is found in the European Court’s refusal to rule that the right to
marry should be recognized to same-sex couples as a matter of European human rights
law. See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (2010). On
the margin of appreciation doctrine, see Andrew Legg, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY (2012);
YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2002); Marisa Iglesias,
Subsidiarity, Margin of Appreciation and International Adjudication within a Cooperative
Conception of Human Rights, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 393 (2017).
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could not be a valid argument to deny individuals their fundamental
rights or “to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural
discrimination that [sexual] minorities have suffered.”72 The Court
supported its argument with “different international and
comparative law sources,”73 although the Court only referred to
reports by Special Rapporteurs and three decisions by the
Colombian Constitutional Court.74 The Court could have used
(again) the general comments and communications from treaty
bodies, as these are the authoritative bodies tasked with interpreting
major human rights treaties. It could also have used the European
Court of Human Rights’ case law and all the legal developments
found in Latin America. These could have really articulated a
reference to “different” sources of international and comparative
law. Thus, through a combination of both universal and local
fundamental rights law, the Court could have framed its rejection to
the State’s “lack of consensus” argument—a claim that other States
have also made when called on to account for discriminatory acts
against same-sex couples.75
Against the newly-established scope of the right to equality, the
Inter-American Court addressed the different arguments that the
Supreme Court of Chile made in its May 2004 decision. As the
district court of Villarrica had done in 2003, the Inter-American
Court plainly rejected the argument that the girls could be subject to
discrimination due to their mother’s sexual orientation.76 The Court
held that the justification of “a distinction in treatment and the
restriction of a right, based on the alleged possibility of social
discrimination, proven or not . . . cannot be used as legal grounds
for a decision.”77 On the issue of an alleged confusion of sexual
roles, the Inter-American Court observed that the Chilean court
“limited itself to the application of a test of speculative damage,
merely referring . . . to the ‘possible confusion of sexual roles’ and
the ‘situation of risk for the girls’ development’ without specifying
the connection between said cohabitation and the alleged

72
73
74
75
76
77

Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 92.
Id. ¶ 92 n.114 (emphasis added).
Id.
See infra Part II.B.
Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 119.
Id.
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deterioration.”78
Finally, the Court addressed the Chilean court’s assertion that
the girls had a right to be raised in a family “structured
normally . . . according to the proper traditional model”79 with a
two-pronged response: (1) the Court noted that the American
Convention on Human Rights does not define the family and does
not protect a “traditional” model of it;80 and (2) following a case
decided by the European Court of Human Rights which used the
principle of proportionality,81 the Inter-American Court rebuked the
Chilean court’s judgment as a “limited, stereotyped perception of
the concept of family, which has no basis in the [American]
Convention.”82
As a consequence of the infringement upon Ms. Atala’s right to
equality and non-discrimination, the Inter-American Court found
that Chile also violated two other rights: the right to private life and
the right to family life.83 On the former, the Court held that “Ms.
Atala’s sexual orientation is part of her private life and therefore any
interference in it must meet the standards of suitability, necessity,
and proportionality.”84 The Court then found that the custody
proceeding had been an “arbitrary interference in [Atala’s] private
life, given that sexual orientation is part of a person’s intimacy, and
is not relevant when examining aspects related to an individual’s
suitability as a parent.”85 On the right to family life, the Court
reiterated that the American Convention does not protect a specific
model of family and that Atala, her partner, and Atala’s daughters
in fact formed a family unit.86 Hence, the Chilean court’s arbitrary
interference in their private life based on discriminatory grounds
also affected their right to family life under the American

Id. ¶ 130.
79 Id. ¶ 141 (quoting Supreme Court of Chile, Judgment of May 31, 2004).
80 Id. ¶ 142.
81 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 34–36
(1999). On the principle of proportionality as a tool for constitutional interpretation, see
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
(2012); DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004).
82 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 145.
83 Id. ¶ 161.
84 Id. ¶ 165.
85 Id. ¶ 167.
86 Id. ¶ 176–77.
78
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Convention.87
The Court did not find a violation of the right to judicial
protection against Ms. Atala.88 The Court established that “neither
the Commission nor the representatives . . . provided specific
evidence to disprove the presumption that judges’ subjective
impartiality” against Karen Atala.89 However, the Court did find a
violation to Ms. Atala’s daughters’ “right to be heard and be duly
taken into account” when the Supreme Court failed to consider the
girls’ statements made before the lower courts in the tuition
proceedings.90
Finally, the Inter-American Court found that Chile violated
Atala’s right to equal protection because she was subject to
disciplinary proceedings based on her sexual orientation.91 It
concluded this despite the State’s claims that the inquiry followed
“serious allegations” and was “not at all related to her
homosexuality, but instead [to] . . . complaints and facts verified”
by an appellate court judge who acted as investigator.92 The
investigator judge issued a report stating that Ms. Atala received
visits in her office “by a large number of women” and by her
partner’s parents, who she introduced “as her in-laws,” and that Ms.
Atala “openly expressed her homosexuality” to the judge and
“defended her determination to openly communicate it to the
Court’s officials and Senior Judges.”93 The Inter-American Court
concluded “although the disciplinary investigation began with legal
grounds . . . it did investigate this in an arbitrary manner” and was
therefore a violation of Atala’s right to privacy under the American
Convention.94
87 Art. 11(2) of the American Convention states that, “No one may be the object of
arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.” Art. 17(1) states that,
“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the state.” Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights, art. 11(2), 17(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
88 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 192.
89 Id. ¶ 191.
90 Id. ¶ 208.
91 Id. ¶ 222.
92 Id. ¶ 217.
93 Id. ¶ 229.
94 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 230.
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The case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile thus marked the
beginning of a prominent case law on sexual orientation and gender
identity. Despite the outcomes of subsequent decisions, the InterAmerican Court’s jurisprudence has to some extent failed to
maintain the robustness found in Atala.95 The next sections discuss
two subsequently contentious decisions adopted by the InterAmerican Court and its Advisory Opinion on gender identity. All
of these decisions are based on the Atala precedent, namely, that
sexual orientation and gender identity are protected categories under
the American Convention on Human Rights.
B. Equal Protection and Social Rights: Duque v. Colombia
1. Facts
In February 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights handed down its second decision on the rights of LGBTI
individuals. In Duque v. Colombia, the Court held that the State’s
failure to provide a gay man with equal access to public benefits
following the death of his partner on the grounds that domestic law
did not recognize such benefits for same-sex couples was a violation
of the American Convention on Human Rights’ equal protection
clause.96 The Court based its decision on the Atala doctrine and
expanded it to issues of discrimination and access to social rights
concerning same-sex couples.97 The Court, however, did not agree
with the petitioners on several grounds. More significantly, two
judges wrote dissenting opinions concerning some of the critical
institutional features this Article identifies in the Inter-American
Court’s expansive jurisprudence.98
In March 2002, Ángel Alberto Duque submitted a request to the
Colombian Company Manager of Pensions and Unemployment
Funds (Compañía Colombiana Administradora de Fondos de
Pensiones y Cesantías, COLFONDOS S.A.), inquiring whether he
could obtain the benefits from his recently deceased partner’s

95 Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016); Flor Freire v. Ecuador,
Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
315 (Aug. 31, 2016).
96 See Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310
97 See id.
98 See infra Part II.D.
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pension.99 Duque claimed he lacked financial support and had relied
on his partner’s assistance during the ten years they lived together
as a couple.100 Duque, like his deceased partner, was HIV positive
and needed to cover a prescribed anti-retroviral medication.101 The
Company denied Duque’s request arguing that Colombia’s law on
social security, Law 100 of 1993, only contemplated an individual’s
benefit to receive their deceased partner’s pension if the couple
consisted of a man and a woman.102 The pension company argued
that under Colombian law, same-sex couples were precluded from
obtaining such benefits.103
Duque filed a tutela action before a district court demanding
that the court recognize his right to a survivor’s pension.104 His
main argument was that denying a same-sex partner his deceased
partner’s pension violated several rights, including the rights to
equality and to constitute a family, which are protected by both the
Colombian Constitution and the American Convention on Human
Rights.105 He also stressed that he lived with HIV and received antiretroviral treatment and had no income to cover the treatment.106
The Tenth Civil Municipal Court of Bogota denied the
tutela action on two grounds: first, the court held that Mr. Duque
did not meet the requirements for a beneficiary of a survivor’s
pension under Colombian law; and second, it noted the matter was
not to be solved through a tutela (constitutional) procedure, but in

See Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 70.
100 Id.
101 See id. ¶ 69.
102 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 70.
103 Id.
104 According to the Colombian Constitution, “[e]very person has the right to file a
tutela before a judge, at any time or place, through a preferential and summary proceeding,
for himself/herself or by whomever acts in his/her name for the immediate protection of
his/her fundamental constitutional rights when that person fears the latter may be violated
by the action or omission of any public authority.” CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA
[C.P.] art. 86. As leading commentators on Colombian constitutional law observe, the
tutela is “an important symbol of the new [Colombian] constitutional order . . . a kind of
individual constitutional complaint or special writ for the protection of fundamental
rights . . . the linchpin of the strategy to make constitutional rights real rather than
theoretical.” See MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES 11 (2017).
105 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 77.
106 Id.
99
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an administrative (legal) procedure.107 Duque filed an appeal, but
the Twelfth Civil Court of Bogotá confirmed the district court’s
decision, further noting that under Colombian law a family is
formed through the union of a man and a woman and because a
survivor’s pension is intended to protect the family, same-sex
couples are excluded from that benefit.108 Duque then turned to the
Constitutional Court, but the Court refused to review the case.109
2. Proceeding before the Inter-American System
In February 2005, Duque filed a petition before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, arguing that the State had
violated his rights to personal integrity, fair trial, equal protection,
and judicial protection.110 Six years later, the Inter-American
Commission issued an admissibility report111 and in 2014, a merits
report.112 In October of that year, the Commission took the case
before the Inter-American Court requesting the Court to declare that
Colombia had violated Mr. Duque’s rights under the American
Convention on Human Rights.113
One of the most distinctive features of the case is the significant
developments in Colombian law that occurred between the time Mr.
Duque filed the tutela, in 2002, and the time he initiated proceedings
before the Inter-American Commission, in 2005,—and even after
the case was lodged before the Commission, in 2014. Indeed, the
Colombian State prominently asserted such developments as a
defense that the Inter-American Court should not find Colombia
internationally responsible.114 The first development occurred in
2007, when the Colombian Constitutional Court held that the 1990
Id. ¶ 78.
108 The Circuit Court held that “the survivor’s pension is intended to protect the
family . . . formed by the union of a man and a woman, the only beings capable of
preserving the species through procreation . . . a homosexual union between a man with a
man or a woman with a woman does not, in itself, constitute a family.” Twelfth Civil
Court of Bogotá, Judgment of 19 July 2002, at 92–93 (cited in Duque v. Colombia, ¶ 79).
109 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 80.
110 Duque v. Colombia, Case 12841, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 5/14
(2014) [hereinafter Duque Merits Report].
111 Duque v. Colombia, Case 123-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 150/11
(2011).
112 See Duque Merits Report, supra note 110.
113 See Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310.
114 Id.
107
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Law No 54 (which regulates de facto marital unions) also applied to
same-sex couples.115 The Constitutional Court granted same-sex
couples the same pension and social security benefits as those
enjoyed by heterosexual couples, finding that there was no
constitutional justification for the differentiated treatment between
same-sex couples and heterosexual couples with regard to access to
a survivor’s pension.116 The following year, the Court handed down
a critical decision: in Judgment C-336, the Court held that same-sex
couples who prove their status as “permanent couples” had the right
to a survivor’s pension—the core of Mr. Duque’s claim before the
inter-American system.117 Subsequently, the Court explained that
the scope of Judgment C-336 extended to situations that occurred
before the decision and that same-sex couples could use any of the
mechanisms available to heterosexual couples to prove their
status—until that point, same sex-couples could only use one
evidentiary mechanism.118
According to the State, the decisions adopted by the
Constitutional Court between 2007 and 2011 had radically changed
the legal landscape for same-sex couples in Colombia.119 In
particular, the State argued that “the [international] illicit act ceased
with Judgment C-336 of 2008 . . . and Judgment T-051 of 2010
consolidated the jurisprudential precedent for the protection of
same-sex couples’ pension rights.”120 Despite these allegations, the
Inter-American Court dismissed the State’s claim. It held that at the
time Duque filed his request with the Colombian Company of
Pension Funds—that is, March 2002—Colombia’s law relating to
the right of same-sex couples to a survivor’s pension violated the
right of equality, as enshrined in the American Convention and, as
a result, Colombia was responsible for an international wrongful

115 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2007, juicio C-075
(Colom.) ¶¶ 6.2.3.2, 6.2.4, 6.4 (quoted in Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 81).
116 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 81 (quoting Corte Constitucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], octubre 3, 2007, Sentencia C-811/07, ¶ 6 (Colom.)).
117 Id. ¶ 82 (quoting Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 16,
2008, Sentencia C-336/08 (Colom.)).
118 Id. (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia T-051/10,
febrero 2, 2010, ¶ 6.7 (Colom.); Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court],
noviembre 15, 2011, Sentencia T-860/11, (Colom.)).
119 Id. ¶ 40.
120 Id.
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act.121
The Court reiterated its Atala doctrine, whereby sexual
orientation is a protected category under the American Convention,
and that whenever a State wishes to limit the rights of an individual
based on their sexual orientation (or gender identity) it must provide
a compelling reason.122 The Court noted that the State failed to
provide an “objective and reasonable justification” for the
differentiated treatment to same-sex couples in 2002.123 As in Atala,
the Court in Duque reviewed relevant international human rights
standards, this time with a focus on the practice of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.124 The Court also
surveyed the law of certain Latin American States, thus grounding
its “universal human rights” claims on the practice of local Latin
American law—a method of adjudication that the Court has used in
other socially contentious areas, such as reproductive rights.125
Here, the Court reiterated an important argument—used in
Atala, Flor Freire, and the 2017 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17—on
the “lack of consensus within some countries” (emphasis added) as
to the full respect of the rights of sexual minorities.126 The Court
repeated its Atala doctrine: “the fact that this is a controversial issue
in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter
Id. ¶ 99.
122 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 106.
123 Id. ¶ 124. The Court, however, did not find the State responsible for the violation
of the rights to fair trial and personal integrity. The Court was satisfied with the State’s
claim that domestic courts did not reject Duque’s tutela action due to discrimination and
stereotype. The Court observed that domestic courts referred Mr. Duque to the proper
judicial proceedings to claim the pension benefits and that no proof was offered that
Colombia did not have an effective judicial remedy to claim the payment of social benefits.
Id. ¶¶ 155–57. Further, the Inter-American Court observed that the petitioner was not able
to establish that Colombian courts based their decisions on stereotypes and other
considerations beyond what Colombian law expressly stated at the time. Id. ¶¶ 164–65.
On the allegation concerning the right to life and personal integrity, the Court noted that
Colombian law contemplates protections for HIV positive individuals and that Mr. Duque
failed to prove the “tremendous emotional burden,” Id. ¶ 184, that he allegedly suffered as
a result of the situation as no “medical reports, analysis or tests” were provided by his
attorneys, Id. ¶ 187, and that he also failed to prove that the subsidiary system for social
benefits would have provided fewer benefits than the contributive system. Duque v.
Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 191.
124 Id. ¶¶ 108–09.
125 See Jorge Contesse, The Final Word? Constitutional Dialogue and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 15 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 414, 427 (2017).
126 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 123.
121
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of consensus, cannot lead this Court to abstain from issuing a
decision.”127 This assertion contrasts with the approach favored by
the European Court of Human Rights, which, as already explained,
has precisely used the lack of a “European consensus” to deny the
existence of a right to marry under the European Convention of
Human Rights.128
Significantly, the Inter-American Court “note[d] the parties’
submission that the Colombian Constitutional Court modified the
domestic legislation in the sense of granting same-sex couples
access to survivors’ pension.”129 The Court, however, observed that
some “controversies persist[ed] as the requirements to establish the
status of surviving partner, and the retroactive effect of the
normative change.”130 In particular, the Court noted two issues:
first, the three-year statute of limitations for claims for a survivor’s
pension could affect the petitioner, effectively depriving him of
compensation dating back to his 2002 claim;131 and second, it was
unclear whether Mr. Duque would obtain the totality of the pensions
he failed to receive since 2002 as a result of the discrimination he
suffered.132 These were the grounds that the Court used to proceed
with the review of the case, despite the noted change in legislation
in Colombia, and to ultimately hold Colombia responsible for the
violation of the right to equal protection of Mr. Duque under the
American Convention.133
The inter-American human rights community expected Duque
to be a further development in the Inter-American Court’s
jurisprudence on LGBTI rights, in particular, concerning the
function of social rights.134 The Inter-American Commission
expressly framed the petition as a social-rights one when it
127 Id. (quoting Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 92 (Feb. 24, 2012)).
128 See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (2010).
129 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 130.
130 Id.
131 Id. ¶ 134.
132 Id. ¶ 136.
The Court further noted: “it is reasonable to conclude that the
international unlawful act has not yet been repaired in its entirety because the retroactive
payments that Mr. Duque could receive may not be equivalent to what he would have
received had he not been a victim of discrimination.” Id. ¶ 137.
133 Id. ¶ 138.
134 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 10 (referring to the amici briefs submitted
before the Court).
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submitted the case before the Court.135 Duque was a secondgeneration case, developing the case law initiated with Atala in
2012. Ultimately, however, the Court seemed to have lost sight of
some of the fundamental legal and institutional issues at hand. By
forcing a decision, the Court unnecessarily eroded some key
functions of international adjudication, including the principles of
complementarity and subsidiarity. The Court came to its decision
notwithstanding the clear and solid evidence that Colombian samesex couples were no longer in the situation of Mr. Duque in 2002,
and that at that time neither Colombian law nor Inter-American
human rights law granted same-sex couples (and individuals) the
same rights as heterosexual couples (and individuals).136 Its main
argument was that it was “not possible to fully know” whether Mr.
Duque would receive the benefits to which he was entitled, despite
the State’s claims that he would.137 Instead of forcing an
international conviction against Colombia, a country where—as the
Court itself acknowledged—social rights are judicially protected,
the Court could have remanded the case to domestic authorities to
solve Mr. Duque’s situation.138
The two dissenting opinions filed in the case point in this
direction. Judge Manuel Ventura Robles, writing his last vote as a
sitting judge in the Court, posed a direct question:
How could the Court not apply the complementarity principle and
accept the State’s objection of the petitioner’s failure to exhaust
domestic remedies if the State, through the Constitutional Court’s
judgment, amended its domestic case law and opened the doors to
the reparation of the alleged facts? What else could the State do to
remedy the violation?139

135 See Inter-Amer. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Takes Case involving Colombia to the
Inter-American Court, Press Release No. 144/14 (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2014/144.asp
[https://perma.cc/DL44-A5Z3].
136 Id. ¶ 129–36.
137 Id.
138 For a discussion on the judicialization of social rights in Colombia, see Cesar
Rodriguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669 (2011) and MANUEL CEPEDA
ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES (2017).
139 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, at 2 (separate dissenting opinion by Ventura
Robles, J.).

2019

SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY

375

Similarly, in a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Eduardo Vio
Grossi noted first that the Court could not, as the American
Convention establishes, “rule, as Article 63.1 [of the American
Convention] mandates, that the injured party be ensured the
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated since that had
already occurred.”140 Second, Judge Vio criticized the Court for the
use of secondary sources of international law as if they were
primary ones (like treaties or customary international law).141
Finally, Judge Vio objected to the claim that Colombia failed to
contrast its domestic legislation against international law, the InterAmerican doctrine known as “conventionality control.”142 Judge
Vio noted that, at the time of submission of the original petition,
there was no international obligation to grant recognition to samesex couples.143 Therefore, the State’s act denying Mr. Duque of the
survivor’s pension was not—and could not have been—an
international wrongful act.144
C. Perceived Sexual Orientation as a Protected Category:
Flor Freire v. Ecuador
A few months after the Inter-American Court handed down its
Duque judgment, it decided the case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador.145
In Flor Freire, the Court applied the Atala precedent—namely, that
sexual orientation is a protected category under inter-American
human rights law—in the context of military disciplinary
proceedings and in the situation of both actual and perceived sexual
orientation, a situation where an individual’s right to have his honor
respected was also at issue.146
140 Id. at 3 (separate dissenting opinion by Vio Grossi, J.) (internal quotations
omitted).
141 Id. at 9 (“[I]t is not stated that international law may not or shall not regulate the
situation of same-sex couples in the future . . . but that such regulations must be
contemplated by some source of international law, that is, a treaty, customary law or
general principles of law applicable to States parties to the Convention, or to the actual
State at hand pursuant to a unilateral act. None of this occurs in the present case.”).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 13.
144 See id. at 10.
145 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 315 (Aug. 31, 2016).
146 In Flor Freire, the Court also addressed issues concerning the right to judicial
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Homero Flor Freire was a Military Police official, who reached
the rank of lieutenant and remained an active-duty member of the
Ecuadorian Army until his separation from the army in 2002.147 In
2000, Mr. Flor Freire was involved in an incident which has
disputed factual accounts. According to several military officers,
on November 19, 2000, Flor Freire and another soldier were having
sex in Flor’s room.148 This was the narrative that the Ecuadorean
authorities used to dismiss Flor from the army.149 According to the
petitioner’s account, however, while he was on duty, he saw an
intoxicated official outside the Major Coliseum in the city of Shell
Mera, province of Pastaza, where a party was taking place.150 Flor
observed that the official was “having problems” with some people
attending the party and that he was “putting himself at risk and
affecting the honor and reputation of the army.”151 He then decided
to take the intoxicated officer to the Amazonas Military Fort.152
After the officer attempted to return to the party, Flor decided to
move him to his room where there was an extra bed.153 Soon after
he entered the room, a Major entered the room and told Flor Freire
that he was in trouble and that “witnesses had seen him in acts of
homosexuality.”154 The senior officer asked Flor to turn over his
standard-issue weapon.155
Military authorities commenced a disciplinary process against
Mr. Flor Freire based on Article 117 of the Regulations of Military
Discipline, which sanctioned members of the Armed Forces “caught
in acts of homosexuality.”156 In January 2001, the Military Court of
guarantee and fair trial. See id. ¶¶ 159–211. Since these considerations do not concern
issues of sexual orientation and gender identity, they fall outside the scope of this Article
and, therefore, are not discussed here.
147 Homero Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Case 12.743, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
81/13,
¶
12
(Nov.
4,
2013),
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/12743fondoen.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR4TS4W4].
148 Id. ¶ 32.
149 See id.
150 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 57.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 61.
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Law found against Flor and concluded that he must be put on leave
before being discharged pursuant to Article 117 of the Regulations
of Military Discipline.157 Although Flor Freire denied the facts—
and denied even being a homosexual—he argued that the
disciplinary proceeding violated the Ecuadorean Constitution,
which enshrines “the right to take free and responsible decisions on
one’s sexual life.”158
The Military Court rejected the argument, noting that:
The Constitution of Ecuador . . . guarantees the right to make free
and responsible decisions about their sexual life. Nonetheless, in
the armed forces, Article 117 of the Rules of Military Discipline
is in force; it punishes acts of homosexuality, precisely because
of the special nature of the military legislation, its philosophy and
constitutional mission, to cultivate and keep intact and unified
values such as honor, dignity, discipline . . . extolling civicmindedness, exalting respect for the national symbols and the
Ecuadorian nation, in view of the ethical and moral values it
practices, and which are the essential elements of the integral
training of the soldier, all of which is not compatible [with the]
conduct and behavior adopted by the persons investigated since
they are contrary to principles and norms of conduct that all
members of the Armed Forces are obligated to observe, the
Armed Forces being proud to be the moral reservoir of society,
and to have in its ranks men of integrity, capable, responsible, and
with unblemished moral authority that enables them to guide and
lead their subordinates in operations [and] activities particular to
the military career.159

In May 2001, the Council of Subaltern Officers upheld the
157 The Military Court held that Flor Freire and the other officer “subjectively
offended the armed institution, affecting its prestige and reputation . . . causing a scandal
and setting a bad example both at the Military Front and in front of the general public.”
Id. ¶ 76 (quoting Court of Law, Fourth Military Zone, Resolution of Jan. 17, 2001).
158 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR 1998, art. 23. The current
Constitution also protects “[t]he right to freely take informed, voluntary, and responsible
decisions on one’s sexuality and one’s sexual life and orientation.” THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR 2008, art. 66.
159 Homero Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Case 12.743, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
81/13,
¶
40
(Nov.
4,
2013),
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/12743fondoen.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR4TS4W4] (quoting Court of Law, Fourth Military Zone, Resolution of Jan. 17, 2001).
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Military Court’s decision, and in July of that year the Council of
Superior Officers followed suit.160 After the Military Court’s
decision, Flor Freire filed a constitutional injunction (amparo)
before the Sixth Civil Court of Pichincha.161 In July 2001, the court
denied the injunction noting that the amparo action was out of order,
because it was not directed against an act itself with respect to which
the court could make a finding of its illegitimacy.162 Flor appealed
the decision and, in February 2002, the Second Chamber of the
Constitutional Court upheld the court’s decision.163 A few weeks
earlier, Flor Freire had finally been discharged.164
A remarkable feature of the case is that, after the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights issued its merits report in November
2013 making recommendations to the State, Ecuador expressed its
willingness to comply with the Commission’s report.165
Furthermore, following the report, in July 2014 the State held a
public act of atonement at the Ministry of National Defense, where
it unveiled a plaque in honor of Mr. Flor Freire and publicly
apologized to him “for being dismissed . . . in an arbitrary and
unjustified manner, in violation of his constitutional rights.”166 The
State’s attitude suggested that the inter-American human rights
standard set forth in Atala had already been internalized. The reason
the Inter-American Court had to move forward with the case, in
spite of the State’s public act of apology, was the State’s
unwillingness to acknowledge its international responsibility,
similarly to what transpired in the Duque case.167
The Inter-American Court’s decision in Flor Freire is mainly of
interest for two reasons. First, it introduced the notion of
“discrimination by perception” and, second, ruled on the issue of

Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶¶ 79–82.
Id. ¶ 83.
162 Id. ¶ 94.
163 Id. ¶ 98.
164 Id. ¶ 100.
165 Id. ¶¶ 34–36.
166 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 37.
167 Homero Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Case 12.743, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
81/13,
¶
33
(Nov.
4,
2013),
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/12743fondoen.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR4TS4W4].
160
161
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sexual orientation within the Armed Forces.168
Following
developments in international human rights law, the Court observed
that the “concept of ‘discrimination by perception’ is contemplated
in several international instruments,”169 as well as the caselaw and
legislation of numerous countries.170 The fact that the petitioner did
not identify as a homosexual man was of paramount importance,
but, the Court observed, he had nonetheless been a victim of
discrimination on the grounds of his perceived sexual orientation.171
The Court noted that restrictions to sexual relations inside
military facilities were not per se unreasonable, but that Ecuador
had failed to justify why same-sex relations were subject to harsher
punishment than heterosexual relations.172 As a result, the Court
found Ecuador internationally responsible for violating Mr. Flor
Freire’s rights to equality and to have his honor respected, as
recognized by the American Convention.173
The second notable feature of the decision is the Court’s
analysis of sexual orientation within the context of Armed Forces.
The Court noted that there was no inter-American standard on the
matter, but following the caselaw of the European Court of Human
Rights,174 and the caselaw and legislation of several Latin American
countries,175 it concluded that the prohibition against discrimination
“encompasses all spheres of personal development . . . hence, the
exclusion of individuals from the armed forces based on their sexual
orientation, whether real or perceived, is against the American

See Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶¶ 118–20.
The Court cited the 1999 Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (art. 1); the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution on Protection against Violence
and other Human Rights Violations against Persons on the basis of their real or imputed
Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity; and the Report of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Discrimination and violence against individuals
based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. Id. ¶ 122.
170 The Court referred to decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada, and American,
French, and British legislation. Id. at n.177.
171 See id. ¶ 120.
172 Id. ¶ 127.
173 Id. ¶¶ 156–57.
174 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 130.
175 The Court referred to cases from Colombia, Brazil and Peru, and to legislative
changes in Argentina and Chile. See id. ¶¶ 131–35.
168
169
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Convention.”176
With this third contentious decision, the Court solidified its
caselaw on sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for
discrimination. It expanded the Atala precedent to different areas,
such as social rights (as seen in Duque), the special situation of
armed forces, and the significance of both real and perceived
discrimination (Flor Freire).
D. Same-sex Marriage: Does the Court Go Ultra Vires?
On January 9, 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Inter-American Court or Court) released an advisory opinion on
Gender Identity, Equality, and Non-Discrimination of Same-Sex
Couples.177 The Court declared that the change of name and the
rectification of public records and identity documents to conform to
a person’s gender identity are protected by the American
Convention on Human Rights.178
Additionally, the Court
maintained that states must extend all existing legal mechanisms—
including marriage—to same-sex couples.179
The Opinion arose from a request made by Costa Rica for the
Court to interpret the scope of the right to privacy, the right to a
name, and the right to equal protection of the laws under the
American Convention on Human Rights.180 Costa Rica observed
that the protection of rights relating to sexual rights and gender
identity vary significantly across the countries of the Organization
of American States (OAS), and that further clarification as to what
amounts to discrimination was needed.181
The Court established that the change of a name, as well as the
rectification of the image and the sex or gender in public records
Id. ¶ 136 (emphasis added).
Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. ¶ 2. Costa Rica asked the Court to address the following issues: (i)Whether
states must “recognize and facilitate the name change of an individual in accordance with
his or her gender identity”; (ii) Whether the lack of administrative procedures for name
change in such circumstances could be considered contrary to the American Convention
on Human Rights; (iii) Whether the American Convention requires states to recognize all
patrimonial rights that derive from a same-sex relationship; and (iv) Whether there must
be a specific mechanism to govern relationships between persons of the same sex for the
state to recognize all the economic rights that derive from that relationship.
176
177
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and identity documents is a right protected by the American
Convention.182 Such a right is found in general principles pertaining
to the right to a name and the right to identity, as articulated by
international human rights bodies.183
In its arguably most groundbreaking section, the Court’s
opinion addressed—and ultimately went beyond—two specific
questions related to the patrimonial rights derived from
relationships between persons of the same sex: first, that legal
standards apply to said relationships, and second, the mechanisms
that states should use to recognize and protect such relationships.184
On the question of the legal standards that apply to same-sex
relationships, the Court found that an interpretation of the concept
of “family”—a notion that, as explained, the American Convention
does not define—that failed to encompass same-sex relationships
“would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention.”185
Although the Convention’s drafters did not consider such issues, the
Court declared that “by recognizing this type of family, the Court is
adhering to the original intention [of the drafters].”186
The Court thus fashioned an expansive interpretation of its
advisory jurisdiction, finding that “the protection of the family
relationship of a same-sex couple goes beyond mere patrimonial
rights issues,”187 and that all types of rights—whether civil, political,
economic or social—“applicable to the family relationships of
heterosexual couples” should also extend to same-sex couples.188
Costa Rica had submitted a question about patrimonial rights, but
the Court handed down a response regarding all rights—what the
Romans called ultra vires.189
Finally, with regard to the mechanisms that States should use to
protect same-sex relationships, the Court reviewed the international
and comparative practice on the subject, citing its own case law, the

Id. ¶ 116.
183 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶¶ 107–11.
184 See id. ¶ 140. See also Macarena Saez, In the Right Direction: Family Diversity
in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 317, 338 (2019).
185 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶ 189; see also Saez, supra note
184, at 21.
186 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶ 193.
187 Id. ¶ 198.
188 Id.
189 See Ultra Vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
182
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opinions of United Nations treaty bodies, the European Court of
Human Rights’ case law, and the practice of a wide range of
Organization of American States members.190 It noted that “States
can adopt diverse types of administrative, judicial and legislative
measures to ensure the rights of same-sex couples,” and observed
that extending already-existing institutions—including marriage—
to same-sex couples is “the most simple and effective way” to
ensure the realization of the standards set forth by the advisory
opinion.191 However, the Court concluded that the existence of “two
types of formal unions” is “inadmissible.”192
III. Impact
The Inter-American Court’s case law on sexual orientation and
gender diversity has dramatically expanded in a relatively short
period of time.193 The first decision on the matter—Atala, where
the Court held that sexual orientation and gender identity are
protected categories under inter-American human rights law—came
down in 2012.194 Six years later, the Court had expanded its doctrine
to declare that the right to equality—a right that the Inter-American
Court has notably declared a jus cogens norm—mandates all
Organization of American States, including those that are not parties
to the American Convention, to legalize same-sex marriage.195
As the Court has noted in all its decisions on these matters, Latin
American States have been moving towards granting recognition to
sexual orientation and gender identity.196 In this sense, it is possible
to situate the Court’s case law as part of a larger conversation taking
place among, and within, States. The Court can engage with States
in two ways: first, it can seek to impose its own understanding of
the scope of rights, as it did in its advisory opinion, where it held
that the opinion has legal relevance for all OAS members, without
Id. ¶¶ 201–05.
Id. ¶ 218.
192 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶ 224.
193 See Saez, supra note 184, at 13–15.
194 See Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 91 (Feb. 24, 2012).
195 See id. ¶ 79; see also Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13. In contrast, the
European Court of Human Rights declared more than two decades ago that sexual
orientation is a protected category under the European human rights treaty, but it has yet
to declare that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples.
196 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13.
190
191
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making a distinction between American Convention member States
and non-member States, and where it went beyond the scope of the
questions that had been submitted to it. A notorious problem with
this form of engagement is seen in the unprecedented backlash
against the Court, following its Advisory Opinion OC 24/17:197 the
Court’s decision caused a Costa Rican presidential candidate
running on a platform against the Inter-American Court to go from
having little support to becoming the front-runner in a general
election.198
Second, the Court can deepen its adjudication method whereby
it engages with domestic constitutional developments to bolster its
own findings, as seen in Atala and other cases.199 Here the Court
acts more as a partner of constitutional courts and allows their voice
to become “inter-American” by way of the Court’s rulings. For
instance, by inviting ample submissions on the issues before it,200
the Court has remarkably opened its doors to public participation.
In order to solidify its authority, particularly in a context of growing
resistance against international human rights law, the Court should
refrain from seeking to decide all matters and be open to sometimes
“leaving things undecided,”201 let States decide—or at least seek
forms of implementation of the general principles laid out by the
regional court.
In any event, the Court’s caselaw has also significantly impacted
domestic law. After the Court’s advisory opinion was issued in
January 2018, the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican
Constitutional Court requested an opinion from the country’s
Attorney General’s Office, which declared that the Inter-American

197 See Latin America’s Human-Rights Court Moves into Touchy Territory, THE
ECONOMIST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/02/01/latinamericas-human-rights-court-moves-into-touchy-territory
[https://perma.cc/3GYF6WRY].
198 Id. On backlash against the Inter-American Court, see Jorge Contesse, Resisting
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2019), and
Ximena Soley & Silvia Steininger, Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, backlash
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 14 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 237 (2018).
199 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 276–77 (Feb. 24, 2012).
200 See id. ¶¶ 10, 17–23.
201 I take the phrase from Cass Sunstein’s work on judicial minimalism. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3 (2001).
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Court’s advisory opinion is binding upon Costa Rican judges.202
Also, the country’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that
individuals may now change their name at will according to their
gender identity, in conformity with the Inter-American Court’s
decision.203 In Chile, the Supreme Court applied the advisory
opinion to rule that a trans individual had a right to a name change
without the need to undergo surgery or hormonal treatment.204
Similarly, the adoption of Chile’s recent law on gender identity was
influenced by the Court’s caselaw, from Atala to OC-24/17.205 In
Ecuador, a nine-year old trans girl successfully obtained a judicial
pronouncement to have her name changed, in a decision that
partially relied on the Inter-American Court’s OC 24/17.206
It remains to be seen how the irruption of conservative political
movements in Latin America will affect the politics of sexual
orientation and gender identity in the region.207

202 Laura Alvarado, Costa Rica’s Attorney General Confirms Ruling of InterAmerican Court Regarding Same Sex Marriage is Binding, THE COSTA RICA STAR (May
13, 2018), https://news.co.cr/costa-rica-lgbti-rights-gay-rights-costa-rica-marriage/73000/
[https://perma.cc/ZBB4-D7BK].
203 Laura Alvarado, Transgender Population in Costa Rica Will be Able to Choose
the Name Shown in Their ID, THE COSTA RICA STAR (May 14, 2018),
https://news.co.cr/transgender-population-in-costa-rica-will-be-able-to-choose-the-nameshown-in-their-id/73032/ [https://perma.cc/UQY9-7G2T].
204 Corte Suprema [C.S.] [Supreme Court], 29 mayo 2018, “Sentencia del 29 de Mayo
2018,
Rol
de
la
causa:
Decisión,
(Chile),
http://www.pjud.cl/documents/396543/0/CAMBIO+NOMBRE+Y+SEXO+REGISTRA
L+SIN+DATOS.pdf/4e7da234-bffe-4cab-9eab-88aa2765ad94 [https://perma.cc/4GWHFUPL] (party names redacted throughout opinion to protect identities).
205 See Chile Enacts Landmark Gender Identity Law, THE SANTIAGO TIMES (Nov. 29,
2018), https://santiagotimes.cl/2018/11/29/chile-enacts-landmark-gender-identity-law/
[https://perma.cc/2WH6-WGXE].
206 See Oscar Lopez, Mother hopes nine-year-old daughter's gender change will help
others in Ecuador, REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuadorlgbt-transgender/mother-hopes-nine-year-old-daughters-gender-change-will-help-othersin-ecuador-idUSKBN1OB2HN [https://perma.cc/N4AB-H49X]. See Unidad Judicial de
Familia, Niñez y Adolescencia, Juicio No 17986201800604 (Nov. 6, 2018). The
Ecuadorean Civil Registry appealed the decision and, in January 2019, the Provincial
Court submitted the case before Ecuador’s Constitutional Court.
207 See Javier Corrales, The Politics of LGBT Rights in Latin America and the
Caribbean: Research Agendas, 100 EUR. REV. LATIN AMERICAN & CARIBBEAN STUD. 53,
54 (2015) (“The politics of LGBT rights is not just the civil rights issue of our time, but
also probably the state-church issue of our time.”).
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IV. Conclusion
The recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity in
international and domestic law is an impressive phenomenon.
Courts all around the world have expanded the contours of what
used to be a heteronormative body of law, allowing same-sex
couples and gender non-conforming individuals to claim their rights
as human rights. In Latin America, a region where conservative
political forces have exercised significant power, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights’ caselaw on sexual orientation
and gender identity has become a crucial driver of social change.
The Court has reinterpreted the regional human rights norms
allowing for local developments that have expanded the enjoyment
of rights. As the Court’s caselaw expands, however, so does the
pushback against the Court and, more generally, human rights law.
Human rights lawyers and scholars—and the Court itself—must
find ways to contain the resistance against the Court before the
retrenchment of rights that is already seen in the region reverses the
wins of the past decade.
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